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Abstract: This article reviews the literature on the linkages between political tensions, economic 
diplomacy and international trade in the light of China’s rise in the global economy. The existing 
scholarly work suggests that economic diplomacy should be more pivotal in economic exchange with 
China than with Western market economies. In an econometric test, I analyze how diplomatic 
tensions, measured through foreign dignitaries’ meetings with the Dalai Lama, affect the likelihood of 
an official visit from a Chinese leader. The results show that the likelihood of the Chinese leadership 
traveling to a country is 13.6 percent lower if the country’s government receives the Dalai Lama in a 
given year but increases in the following year, supposedly to restore ties. This finding underlines that 
economic diplomacy is an important channel linking political climate and economic exchange between 
nations. 
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“There is no denying that we must, on the premise of country interests, carry out the economy diplomacy against 
the backdrop of globalization, which is the nature requirement of market economy.” 
Gao Hucheng, China’s Minister of Commerce 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The announcement on October 8, 2010 that the Norwegian Nobel Committee had awarded the Nobel 
Peace Prize to Chinese human rights activist Liu Xiaobo set off a controversy in the relations between 
(the People’s Republic of) China and Norway. The Chinese government immediately protested the 
decision with public statements declaring that Liu was a criminal and warning that selecting him for 
the award could harm China-Norway ties.1 With a former Norwegian prime minister on the 
committee, it was difficult for the Norwegian government to distance itself from the award. Three 
days later, the first effects on Norway’s economic diplomacy became apparent: the Chinese 
government canceled a scheduled meeting with the Norwegian fisheries minister Lisbeth Berg-Hansen 
after her arrival in China. She was scheduled to visit Norway’s pavilion at the Shanghai Expo, where 
the country also promotes its fishery products. These would not be the only repercussions. A new set 
of veterinary controls imposed at ports in China on fresh salmon had immediate effects. The data in 
Figure 1 reveal the sharp drop in fresh salmon exports from Norway to China compared with those to 
the rest of the world after the announcement of the Nobel Peace Prize. The imposed controls appeared 
to be Norway-specific; while Norwegian salmon was reported as being left rotting in the ports, the 
flow of Scottish salmon continued uninterrupted.2 What is more, China decided to halt plans to sign a 
free trade agreement with Norway. 
This case of salmon trading represents a key example of how economic diplomacy and foreign 
trade are adversely affected by political tensions. There is a large literature on the trade-politics nexus 
that analyzes the economic consequences of bad political relations (e.g., Pollins 1989a, 1989b; Davis 
and Meunier 2011; Pandya and Venkatesan forthcoming). The rise of China to become the world’s 
largest exporter and second largest economy after the United States (CIA 2015) is likely to alter what 
we know about these relationships. In contrast to the dominating major industrialized economies, 
China is neither a democracy nor has it obtained WTO market-economy status. Yakop and van 
Bergeijk (2011: 264) expect that “[t]he emergence of new economies with very different institutions 
and cultural background will influence global norms and values and this will undoubtedly have an 
impact on the rules of international trade.” In the case of China, the dominant role of the state and of 
                                                     
1 Zheng Xinyi, “Beijing blasts Nobel Peace Prize Meddling,” People’s Daily Online, October 9, 2010. 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90882/7160366.html. 
2 “Norway’s salmon rot as China takes revenge for dissident’s Nobel Prize,” The Independent, October 6, 2011. See also 
Chen and Garcia (2015) for an investigation of Norway’s salmon sanction. 
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state-owned enterprises in particular is likely to alter the role of politics in international commerce 
(e.g., Davis et al. 2014). 
This article reviews the existing literature on the linkages between political tensions, economic 
diplomacy and international trade in the light of the ongoing rise of China. I conclude that economic 
diplomacy is more pivotal in economic exchange with China than with Western market economies. 
Economic diplomacy is expected to suffer during political tensions but can also be a tool to restore 
ties. In this regard, this article also provides systematic empirical evidence that China alters its 
leadership’s travel pattern in response to diplomatic tensions, as measured by official receptions of the 
Dalai Lama in its trade partner countries. China perceives foreign officials’ meetings with the Dalai 
Lama as interferences into its internal affairs that usually result in worsening relations with China (see 
Fuchs and Klann 2013). The results show that the likelihood of the Chinese leadership traveling to a 
country is 13.6 percent lower if the country’s government receives the Dalai Lama in a given year but 
increases in the following year, supposedly to restore ties. This finding suggests that economic 
diplomacy is an important mechanism linking the bilateral political climate to economic exchange. 
I proceed as follows. The second section provides an overview on China’s growing diplomatic 
activities around the globe. In the third section, I review the existing literature on the political 
determinants of trade in the light of China’s rise in the global economy. The fourth section provides 
the brief econometric analysis of the timing of official receptions of the Dalai Lama and China’s 
leadership by China’s trading partner countries. The final section concludes. 
 
2. CHINA’S EMERGENCE IN DIPLOMACY 
The Chinese Civil War in the aftermath of the Second World War left the world with two Chinese 
governments that each claimed to represent the one China: the Communist-ruled People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) on the mainland and the Republic of China (ROC) on the island Taiwan. Both entities 
followed the so-called One-China Policy, demanding that a country ceases diplomatic relations with 
the one entity when it recognizes the other. Over the last decades, the PRC and the ROC pursued a 
“dollar diplomacy” to gain diplomatic recognition from countries around the world (Taylor 1998). 
While the linkages in the world’s diplomatic network are typically driven by geographic proximity, 
countries’ military and economic power, and closeness in terms of political ideology (Neumayer 
2008), in the case of China, it appears that the pattern of diplomatic recognition of one of the two 
Chinas was and is dominated by economic considerations (Rich 2009). An important tool of both 
governments’ economic diplomacy is foreign aid, a major goal of which is diplomatic recognition by 
the recipient (e.g., Dreher and Fuchs 2015; Strange et al. forthcoming). With the growing economic 
dominance of the PRC and the associated aid flows of considerable size, Beijing has gained the upper 
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hand and both entities follow a so-called “diplomatic truce” since shortly after President Ma Ying-jeou 
of Taiwan assumed office in 2008. 
 Figure 2 shows the number of countries (or territories) that recognize the ROC (Taiwan) rather 
than the PRC (data from Rich 2009, own update). As can be seen, the number of countries recognizing 
the government in Taipei decreased substantially after the PRC replaced the ROC in the United 
Nations in 1971.3 To be precise, the number of entities recognizing the ROC fell from 57 in 1970 to 21 
in 2014, of which Burkina Faso, Guatemala and Malawi are the largest countries in terms of 
population size. Figure 2 also plots the number of embassies received and sent by the government in 
Beijing. There is a steady increase in diplomatic representations since 1970 so that the PRC maintains 
160 embassies in foreign countries in 2010, while hosting almost as many foreign embassies at home 
(158). In parallel, and mainly fueled by the economic reform program that started in the late 1970s, the 
PRC’s bilateral trade pattern also diversified (Zhang et al. 2011), so that today the PRC is trading with 
virtually all countries in the world. 
 While embassies are good indicators of the existence of diplomatic relations between 
countries, the occurrence of state visits or other high-level meetings serve as proxies of the intensity of 
diplomatic relations. Figure 3 shows a map of the geographic distribution of China’s leadership travel 
across the globe over the 1998-2006 period (data from Kastner and Saunders 2012). It contains every 
trip abroad made by President Jiang Zemin and his Prime Minister Zhu Rongji, as well as by his 
successor President Hu Jintao and his Prime Minister Wen Jiabao. Russia was China’s favorite 
destination during this period. In seven of nine years a Chinese leader, either president or prime 
minister or both, made at least one trip to the neighboring country. Germany, the United Kingdom, and 
Vietnam follow on the list with five years of top-level travels. However, more than half of the world’s 
countries were blind spots for the Chinese leadership during the Jiang and Hu presidencies, including 
most of West and Central Africa, the countries of the Andean Community, Sweden, and Norway, 
among many others. 
Since a visit by a Chinese leader is costly in terms of his personal opportunity costs and in 
terms of preparation time invested by government officials, scholars see their travel pattern as a way to 
draw inference about China’s foreign policy preferences. Most notably, Kastner and Saunders (2012) 
analyze the travel patterns of the two Chinese presidents and prime ministers during the 1998-2008 
period. They conclude that the travel behavior of China’s leaders is more broadly consistent with 
China being a status-quo state that integrates into the international system rather than a revisionist 
                                                     
3 As discussed by Neumayer (2008), pressure from the anti-Communist opposition in the United States prevented the U.S.—
and indirecty also its allies—to recognize the PRC until the U.S. normalized its relations with China under President Richard 
Nixon. 
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state challenging the existing order.4 In line with this, Bader (2015) finds that China’s high-level 
diplomacy has no significant impact on the likelihood of survival of autocratic regimes.5 
Economic diplomacy can be defined as the form of diplomacy that is concerned with 
economic-policy issues. China very actively engages in economic diplomacy and through its 
diplomatic network and tools of economic statecraft. Jiang (2011) claims that China tries to show its 
‘great power style’ through its economic diplomacy. At the same time, Jiang argues that the emerging 
power “is still far from being a benign hegemon because of its level of development, domestic 
political constraints, and tension between political and economic interests.” Rather than projecting 
altruistic motivations in its economic diplomacy, China supposedly strives for mutual benefit. 
Economic motives are shown to be at the forefront of visits of the Chinese leadership. As summarized 
by Kastner and Saunders (2012: 165), “Chinese leaders typically travel with a large entourage of 
government officials and business leaders; summit visits often include the announcement of Chinese 
aid commitments, investment deals, and signing of various political and economic agreements.” Shi 
and Yue (2014) find a positive link between trade and Chinese leadership meetings and take this as 
evidence that economic motives dominate China’s foreign-policy agenda. Despite the dominance of 
economic goals, there is evidence that China uses its growing diplomatic network to influence 
outcomes in international politics, including countries’ voting alignment in the United Nations General 
Assembly (Strüver forthcoming). 
Today’s Chinese economic diplomacy is seen as part of realizing the “Chinese Dream” put 
forward by President Xi Jinping to realize the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” Gao 
Hucheng, China’s Minister of Commerce, listed four basic principles of economic diplomacy (Gao 
2015). First, diplomacy should serve the economy; economic diplomacy is the most important part of 
diplomacy. Second, economic diplomacy and China’s policy of “opening up” should go hand in hand 
and the country “should plan economic diplomacy through an open mind.” Third, China should 
maintain and expand the role of trade and economic cooperation as the main channels in its economic 
diplomacy to serve its development. Fourth, economic diplomacy should not be pursued as a zero-sum 
game but rather create mutual benefits and win-win situations, thereby creating a “favorable 
international environment.” In the light of Xi’s vision of the “Chinese dream” and the strongly 
growing economy—albeit now at a slower pace—it is likely that China’s economic diplomacy will 
continue to flourish over the foreseeable future. 
  
                                                     
4 Note that they also observe some deviations from this pattern. Most notably, they find a higher likelihood of Chinese 
leaders traveling to rogue states. 
5 The same holds for arms sales and foreign aid from China as well, but Bader (2015) finds exports to China to be associated 
with autocratic longevity. 
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3. THE POLITICS-TRADE NEXUS AND THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY 
Political and commercial relations are intertwined (Hirschman 1945; Baldwin 1985).6 In addition to 
the purely economic characteristics of goods and services such as price, quantity and quality, political 
relations can also influence trade. Pollins (1989a, 1989b) develops a public choice model of bilateral 
trade flows. Extending the concept of welfare to include political ties, Pollins posits that import 
decisions are influenced by the place of origin of the traded goods and services as they depend on the 
political climate between trading partners. He argues that risk-averse importers minimize the risks of 
trade disruptions by rewarding political friends and punishing adversaries. Exploiting bilateral event 
data on conflict and cooperation for the 1955-1978 period, his empirical results support the hypothesis 
that greater amity between trading parties increases trade, while greater hostility has a trade-
dampening effect. Similarly, Gowa and Mansfield (1993) argue that gains from trade are a source of 
security externalities as trade-induced efficiency frees resources for military use in the economy of the 
trading partner. Consequently, it is in a country’s strategic interest to concede such gains to befriended 
countries and deny them to enemies. States may thus rely on trade interdependencies to strategically 
reward allies or punish adversaries. Empirically, they show that trade is stronger between allied 
countries.7 Kastner (2007) provides evidence that the trade-reducing impact of bad bilateral political 
relations is reduced if internationalist economic interests are strong, which is proxied for by low trade 
barriers. According to him, this provides an explanation of the strong commercial ties between the 
PRC and the ROC despite the obvious tensions. Davis and Meunier (2011) argue that globalization 
constrains governments to politicize trade due to sunk costs.8 
Despite the constraining effects of internationalist economic interests and sunk costs linked to 
globalization, several empirical studies provide evidence that the political climate affects trade with 
China. Fuchs and Klann (2013), for example, find that political tensions caused by foreign dignitaries 
receiving the Dalai Lama lead to a significant reduction of these countries’ exports to China.9 Che et 
al. (2015) find that Sino-Japanese historical animosity still affects today’s trade between the two Asian 
economic powers. Analyzing Sino-Japanese tensions following the reauthorization of a controversial 
history textbook in 2005, Fisman et al. (2014) find that the episode led to a stronger decline in imports 
of Chinese state-owned enterprises from Japan than for private companies. Splitting total trade into 
trade through state-owned enterprises and trade through private entities, Davis et al. (2014) show that 
negative political events adversely affect imports through state-owned enterprises but not private 
companies. According to He et al. (2015), political tensions between Beijing and Taipei make firms of 
the PRC’s political opponents with strong trade and investment ties to the mainland suffer from a 
                                                     
6 While I focus on non-militarized political tensions, a strand of the literature investigates the link between militarized 
disputes and trade (e.g., Martin et al. 2008). 
7 Incorporating new trade theory, empirical evidence in Gowa and Mansfield (2004) suggests that alliances (and other 
measures of bilateral relations) matter more for trade under increasing returns to scale than under constant returns to scale. 
8 On the role of regime type in bilateral trade, see Morrow et al. (1998), Mansfield et al. (2000), and Aidt and Gassebner 
(2010). 
9 See also Lin et al. (2015) on the firm-level dynamics driving this “Dalai Lama Effect.” 
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decline in stock returns. Focusing on consumer reactions, Hong et al. (2011) relate the Chinese 
boycotts of French products during the 2008 Beijing Olympics to reduced sales of French cars in 
China. Heilman (2015) analyzes the reactions to territorial disputes over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands 
and identifies a temporary effect on consumer goods and highly-branded signature products. 
Moreover, there is some evidence that trade dependence on China pushes partner countries’ policy 
positions in China’s favor (Flores-Macías and Kreps 2013; Kastner forthcoming). Taken together, this 
is clear evidence suggesting a strong politicization of trade with China. 
Countries’ engagement in economic diplomacy is a likely channel linking the bilateral climate 
to the intensity of bilateral trade. Overall, previous research on economic diplomacy (see Bergeijk 
2009 for an overview) suggests that a positive link exists between economic diplomacy and bilateral 
trade. Analyzing export flows from 22 countries for 2002 and 2003 in a gravity framework, Rose 
(2007) finds that the size of a country’s diplomatic service increases its exports. Each additional 
consulate is associated with an increase of exports by about six to ten percent. Focusing on export 
flows of 17 Spanish regions for 1995-2003, Gil et al. (2008) show that the existence of Spanish 
regional trade agencies abroad is positively associated with exports to the respective partner countries. 
However, Head and Ries (2010) do not find empirical evidence that Canadian trade missions have a 
trade-promoting effect. With respect to state visits, Nitsch’s (2007) provides empirical evidence that 
state and official visits foster trade. Estimating export flows from France, Germany and the United 
States over the 1948-2003 period, his results show that one visit is associated with an eight to ten 
percent increase in exports. Summarizing the findings of 32 prior contributions in a meta analysis, 
Moons and Bergeijk (2014) speak of an overall significantly positive effect of economic diplomacy on 
trade and investment (with the exception of state visits). 
Previous research also shows a trade-promoting role of economic diplomacy in the case of 
China. Empirical evidence in Zhang et al. (2011) confirms for China over the 1950-2002 period that 
diplomatic relations and state visits are associated with larger bilateral trade flows.10 Lin and Yan 
(2015) provide empirical evidence according to which visits of African ministers to China lead to 
increases in Chinese exports to these countries. This effect appears to mainly operate via the extensive 
margin, i.e., an increasing number of products exported from China to Africa. Since the effect is 
dominated by exports in capital-intensive manufacturing goods through state-owned enterprises, Lin 
and Yan interpret this as “aid” to Africa. While state visits do not appear to robustly boost trade in 
other contexts (Moons and Bergeijk 2014), these finding are thus in line with the expectations in 
Veenstra et al. (2011) according to which economic diplomacy matters (more) for trade with 
“Southern” countries. The finding of McGillivray and Smith (2004) that leadership changes adversely 
affects trade with autocracies but not with democracies suggests that the role of economic diplomacy 
should be bigger for commercial relations with autocratic China. 
                                                     
10 The same holds for foreign cooperation and political system similarity but not for preferential trading agreements. 
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It appears that Chinese economic diplomacy assumes a greater role to facilitate trade than in 
the context of Western market democracies. First, economic diplomacy opens doors in emerging 
economies like China, where “government is still regarded as a natural partner in the economy” 
(Moons and Bergeijk 2014: 2). The share of state-owned enterprises in China’s trade is still sizable. 
These companies do not only have to follow government objectives by their very definition, they are 
also financially dependent on the government and show a large overlap in terms of the staffing of their 
leadership (Davis et al. 2014). These linkages make it impossible to regard government and business 
as separate entities and require a healthy economic diplomacy towards China. 
Second, economic diplomacy sends signals that there are no severe political resistances to 
future cooperation (Moon and Bergeijk 2014). This is crucial since importers may respond to political 
tensions as they fear the risk of trade interruption, as argued above. An anticipated conflict alone 
might trigger reductions of bilateral trade due to “the threat of future government action to restrict 
trade” (Morrow et al. 1998, p. 650). Such signals do not only matter for the producer but also the 
consumer. As such, economic diplomacy can also send signals to patriotic consumers to not overreact 
to political tensions between countries. Previous research shows that consumer reactions to political 
tension can harm bilateral trade (e.g., Michaels and Zhi 2010; Antoniades and Clerides 2015; Heilman 
2015; Pandya and Venkatesan forthcoming). More broadly, the more affinity, trust and admiration 
exists between nations the stronger is also their bilateral trade—all these factors appear to affect 
consumer preferences (Disdier and Mayer 2007; Guiso et al. 2009; Rose forthcoming). Since the 
Internet has reduced the Chinese government’s scope to control protests (Heilman 2015), signaling a 
cooling of bilateral tensions through diplomatic activities may be particularly helpful to dissolve 
consumer boycotts. 
Third, economic diplomacy can bridge cultural gaps (Bergeijk 2009). This appears crucial in 
light of Guiso et al. (2009) who find that trade increases with bilateral trust, which is deeply rooted in 
culture.11 Since the majority of world trade still lies in the West, economic diplomacy can thus fulfill 
its role and facilitate commercial relations between culturally distant countries. Moreover, Yu et al.’s 
(2015) finding that the role of trust is bigger for trade with countries that have a relatively weak rule of 
law underlines the importance of trust-improving measures of economic diplomacy for trade with 
China.12 
The greater the role of Chinese economic diplomacy in facilitating trade, the greater the 
destruction of commerce if economic diplomacy is interrupted as a consequence of political tensions. 
During bad times, economic diplomacy is hampered in its role to reduce informal trade barriers, lower 
                                                     
11 In a related study, Disdier and Mayer (2007) demonstrate that bilateral affinity has a trade-increasing effect. 
12 China ranks 71th of 102 according the Rule of Law Index of the World Justice Project (http://data.worldjusticeproject.org/) 
and 120th of 209 according to the 2014 value of the rule-of-law dimension of the Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(www.govindicators.org/). 
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transaction costs and increase transparency and trust between foreign actors.13 A deterioration in the 
bilateral political climate should not only lead China to shut down its economic diplomacy with a 
particular country, economic diplomacy can also play an important role in restoring ties at a later 
stage. To date, the literature on economic diplomacy does not provide systematic evidence of whether 
a deterioration of the political climate is associated with a reduced engagement in economic 
diplomacy. This is what we examine for the case of China. 
 
4. A DALAI LAMA EFFECT ON ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY? AN EMPIRICAL TEST 
The Chinese government frequently puts pressure on governments to not receive the Dalai Lama, the 
religious and formerly political leader of Tibetans. The statement of a spokesman of the Mongolian 
government, explaining why the Dalai Lama had not been invited by the Mongolian government in 
1991, is telling: “Frankly speaking, there is a question of the Chinese president visiting Mongolia this 
year.”14 The Mongolian government thus avoided to officially receive the Dalai Lama as it feared the 
cancelation of a planned visit of President Yang Shangkun. In 2009, when President Barack Obama 
decided not to receive the Dalai Lama, the media deemed this decision “unprecedented” and surmised 
that the president had strategically delayed the reception until after his state visit to Beijing.15 
Anecdotal evidence indeed suggests that the threats to sanction Dalai Lama-receiving 
countries are carried out and affect economic diplomacy. For example, in 2008 China sent a strong 
message to France after then French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s meeting with the Dalai Lama: 
Beijing canceled the 11th annual EU-China summit scheduled for that year. Over a hundred high-
ranking Chinese politicians and business leaders would have met with their European counterparts. In 
what follows, I analyze whether there is a systematic adverse effect of short-lived political tensions on 
economic diplomacy. Finding such evidence would suggest that economic diplomacy is an important 
channel for the political climate to affect economic exchange, at least in the case of China. 
 
(a) Research Design 
In order to analyze the relationship between short-lived political tensions and economic diplomacy, I 
study the effect of meetings of foreign government members with the Dalai Lama on the likelihood of 
the Chinese leadership, i.e., the Chinese president or prime minister, to visit a particular country. To 
obtain information on Chinese leadership trips, I use the annual breakdown of the dataset in Kastner 
and Saunders (2012), which covers parts of the Jiang and Hu presidencies. The data cover all visits 
                                                     
13 See again Bergeijk (2009) for a discussion of the benefits of economic diplomacy. 
14 “Mongolia bows to pressure, won’t invite Dalai Lama,” The Daily Gazette, 25 April 1991. 
15 See supplementary material of Fuchs and Klann (2013) for more anecdotal evidence. 
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over the 1998-2006 period as collected through yearbooks and the official website of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs as well as media reports.16 My variable of interest is a binary variable that takes a 
value of one if the Dalai Lama was received by a government member in the partner country in a 
particular year (data from Fuchs and Klann 2013). 
 Building on previous work on Chinese leadership travel (Kastner and Saunders 2012; Shi and 
Yue 2014), I use the following control variables. Economic factors include a country’s (logged) GDP 
per capita (in constant 2005 US$), (logged) total population size, energy depletion, and mineral 
depletion (the latter two variables as a share of gross national income (GNI); all data from World Bank 
2014). I further control for (logged) bilateral trade between China and its partner country (data from 
UN Comtrade). Institutional and political variables include a country’s level of democracy as captured 
by the Polity2 variable from Marshall et al. (2013), its voting alignment with China (data from 
Strezhnev and Voeten 2012, extended as in Kilby 2009), a binary variable that takes a value of one if a 
country maintains diplomatic relations with Taiwan (data from Rich 2009), the trend-indicator value 
of arms exports from China in constant 1990 US$ (data from SIPRI 2015), and binary variables that 
take a value of one if a country is under UN and US sanctions, respectively (data from Hufbauer et al. 
2007). All control variables are lagged by one year to mitigate endogeneity concerns. Finally, a set of 
time-invariant control variables is included in those regressions that exclude fixed effects, namely 
(logged) distance to China and binary variables that take a value of one if the partner country is an 
OECD member, a G-20 member, located in Africa, and in Asia, respectively. All regressions include 
year dummies to account for year-specific determinants of China’s leadership trips. The Appendix lists 
all variables employed in the analysis along with their sources and descriptive statistics. 
 I start by running a linear probability model to facilitate interpretation of coefficients, continue 
with logit regressions to take account of the binary nature of the dependent variable, then introduce 
country-fixed effects to the linear probability model and run a conditional fixed-effects logit model to 
control for unobserved country characteristics. Finally, I implement an instrumental-variables 
approach to account for the potential endogeneity of Dalai Lama meetings. 
 
(b) Main Results 
Column 1 of Table 1 presents the results of the simple linear probability model. I find that the 
likelihood of the Chinese leadership traveling to a country is 13.6 percent lower if the country’s 
government receives the Dalai Lama in a given year. The corresponding coefficient is statistically 
significant at the one-percent level. This also applies to the regression in column 2, where I estimate a 
logit model rather than ordinary least squares. Taken together, this is evidence in support of my 
                                                     
16 Visits for the sole purpose of attending a multilateral meeting are excluded. 
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expectation that political tensions and economic diplomacy are systematically related. Since this 
finding may be driven by unobserved country-specific characteristics, the model in column 3 adds 
country-fixed effects to the linear probability model and the conditional logit is shown in column 4. It 
is reassuring that the coefficient on the Dalai Lama variable is still statistically significant at the one-
percent level (column 3) and five-percent level (column 4), respectively. The coefficient increases in 
absolute size when I add country-fixed effects: if a country receives the Dalai Lama in a given year, it 
is 15.1 percent less likely to be paid a visit by the Chinese leadership in the same year. 
This finding may not reflect a causal relationship in the sense that a meeting with the Dalai 
Lama leads the Chinese leadership to cut a country out of their travel plans. It may rather be the case 
that governments already planning to receive the Chinese president or prime minister do not invite the 
Dalai Lama during the same year. Such an inverse causal relationship would still be in line with my 
broader argument as governments apparently have reasons to be less hospitable vis-à-vis the Dalai 
Lama to avoid harming economic diplomacy. Nevertheless, I make use of a Two-Stage-Least-Squares 
(2SLS) model to account for the potential endogeneity of Dalai Lama meetings and to identify any 
causal effects of Dalai Lama meetings on the travel behavior of the Chinese leadership. I employ the 
three instruments introduced in Fuchs and Klann (2013) in our study of the effect of Dalai Lama 
meetings on exports to China. The first instrument is a binary variable that takes a value of one if the 
Dalai Lama traveled to a partner country in a given year. Such visits are usually based on invitations 
from Buddhist or Tibetan communities to give teachings and public talks rather than invitations from 
government members. The second instrument is the number of days that the Dalai Lama visits, which 
proxies for the public awareness of his presence in the country that is likely to exert pressure on the 
government to receive him. The third instrument is the number of Tibet Support Groups (TSG) in a 
trading partner country used to account for the demands of such pressure groups on government 
members to receive the Dalai Lama. The mere presence of the Dalai Lama in the country, the length of 
his stay, and the number of TSGs should not affect economic diplomacy through channels other than 
as a result of a meeting between the Dalai Lama and a country’s dignitary. 
Column 5 of Table 1 shows the 2SLS results. The Angrist-Pischke-F-test statistic supports the 
relevance of the instruments and they also pass the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions and the 
Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test. The coefficient on the binary variable indicating whether the 
Dalai Lama was received by a head of government in a given year is negative and statistically 
significant at the one-percent level, i.e., Dalai Lama meetings have a causal negative effect on the 
travel patterns of China’s leadership. 
Few control variables explain the travel pattern of China’s leaders in the annual panel data 
set.17 Excluding country-fixed effects and thus also exploiting variation between China’s partner 
                                                     
17 Note that my results are not directly comparable to Kastner and Saunders (2012) as they run their regressions on two cross-
sectional datasets for the Jiang and Hu presidencies and thus do not exploit variation over time. 
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countries (column 1), I find that China’s leaders are more likely to travel to richer, larger and more 
open countries, all significant at the one-percent level. Moreover, countries recognizing Taiwan and 
those sanctioned by the United States are less likely to be visited, while China’s neighbors and G-20 
members are more likely to be on its travel itinerary. The logit results are similar with the exception of 
the G-20 binary variable which loses statistical significance (column 2). Focusing on the variation 
within countries over time (column 3), I find that China’s leaders are more likely to travel to countries 
with growing energy resources. All other control variables fail to reach statistical significance at 
conventional levels. The conditional logit regressions in column 4 find significantly negative 
coefficients on Taiwan recognition and UN sanctions in addition to the significantly positive 
coefficient on energy. 
 
(c) Further Specifications 
In order to analyze the timing of the effect of Dalai Lama meetings on the travel pattern of China’s 
leadership, I include separate binary variables that take a value of one if the Tibetan leader is received 
by a government member in the second year after, the year directly after, the current year, the previous 
year, two years ago and three years ago, respectively. I expect no significant effect of Dalai Lama 
meetings in future years, as such meetings have not been decided upon. This serves as a placebo test. 
Including lagged values helps us understand the duration of the negative effect on high-level 
diplomacy. If the Chinese leadership only postpones trips or if China makes moves to restore ties, one 
might also find positive effects of earlier Dalai Lama meetings.18 
As can be seen from the linear probability model with country-fixed effects in column 1 and 
from the conditional logit model in column 2 of Table 2, the results show statistically significant 
negative coefficients on the likelihood of a visit from the Chinese leadership in a given year and no 
significant effects for future years as expected. Already in the year after the meeting, the coefficient on 
the Dalai Lama variable turns significantly positive. It appears that trading partners engage in 
increased diplomatic activities to improve their ties following a visit from the Dalai Lama.19 This is in 
line with anecdotal evidence (Fuchs and Klann 2013). For example, after a meeting between the Dalai 
Lama and Austrian Chancellor Alfred Gusenbauer in 2007, Austrian diplomats were banned from 
contact with Chinese officials, leading to what the media described as a “minor ice-age” between the 
                                                     
18 Anecdotal evidence suggests that it takes about a year for diplomatic relations to recover (Fuchs and Klann 2013). For 
example, 16 months after the 2013 meeting of Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaite with the Dalai Lama, a Chinese news 
outlet reports that “China-Lithuania relations are back on track” referring to a recent meeting of China’s prime minister Li 
Keqiang with his Lithuanian counterpart Algirdas Butkevicius “on the sidelines” of a multilateral meeting at which 
“Lithuania withdrew support of the Tibet independence movement.” See http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/906948.shtml 
(accessed 22 November 2015). 
19 Both coefficients are similar in their absolute size and a t-test does not reject the null hypothesis that the two coefficients 
are equal in absolute size at conventional levels of significance. 
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two countries. In the following year, a state visit of the Austrian chancellor in Beijing marked the end 
of the diplomatic tensions caused by the Dalai Lama reception. 
Next, I employ a narrower definition of Dalai Lama meetings and restrict the variable to take a 
value of one only if a president or prime minister receives the Dalai Lama, thus excluding all other 
government members. Fuchs and Klann (2013) find that systematic trade reductions are only caused 
by meetings with heads of state or government. In line with this finding, I expect such encounters at 
the highest political level to lead to more severe interruptions in high-level economic diplomacy. As 
can be seen from columns 3 and 4 of Table 2, the Chinese government seems to respond more 
severely to such encounters at the highest political level: The coefficient on Dalai Lama meetings in 
the current year becomes more pronounced and the positive coefficient on Dalai Lama meetings in the 
previous year, previously indicating a rapid restoration of ties, loses its statistical significance at 
conventional levels. 
Using the fixed-effects linear probability model, Table 3 shows how the results change in 
response to alternations of the dependent variable. For the reader’s convenience, column 1 shows the 
results from column 3 of Table 1 for comparison. First, I exclude visits made to a partner country in 
extension of a multilateral meeting. Arguably, such meetings might be different in character as the 
leaders do not face additional costs in terms of travel time, which may make it more likely that a 
leader schedules such a visit. As can be seen from column 2, the coefficient on the Dalai Lama 
variable is slightly smaller and remains statistically significant at conventional levels. Second, I 
analyze separately trips by China’s president (column 3) and prime minister (column 4). While both 
coefficients on the Dalai Lama variable are negative as expected, only the coefficient on presidential 
trips reaches statistical significance at conventional levels. It can thus be concluded that the revealed 
relationships between political tensions and economic diplomacy are mainly driven by changes in the 
president’s and not the prime minister’s travel patterns. Third, I show regressions with the logged 
number of days that the president and prime minister combined spend in a particular country as a 
further alternative dependent variable. Again, there is a statistically negative coefficient on the Dalai 
Lama variable (column 5). 
Finally, I replace the dependent variable with a binary variable that takes a value of one if a 
country’s leader directly interacted with the Chinese prime minister or president. In contrast to the 
baseline dependent variable, this variable thus also captures meetings that take place in China and not 
only those hosted in partner countries. Data have been obtained from Bader (2015) who collected the 
information from a list of all Chinese agreements with foreign countries from the Journal of Current 
Chinese Affairs. The measure thus comes with the disadvantage that it only covers those encounters 
that led to the signing of an agreement. As it could be argued that Dalai Lama meetings can also 
negatively impact the success of such meetings, I do not employ it as my preferred measure. Using it 
as a test of robustness, however, yields results that are similar to the leadership travel data (column 6). 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
This article reviewed the literature on the linkages between political tensions, economic diplomacy 
and international trade in the light of China’s rise in the global economy. Previous research suggests 
that economic diplomacy should be more pivotal in economic exchange with China than with Western 
market economies. As such, the deterioration of bilateral commerce should also be more pronounced 
when economic diplomacy is interrupted as a consequence of political tensions. During bad times, 
economic diplomacy is hampered in its role to reduce informal trade barriers, lower transaction costs 
and increase transparency and trust between foreign actors. However, it is not only the case that 
China’s economic diplomacy will be hindered when relations with a particular country worsen, 
economic diplomacy can also play an important role in restoring ties at a later stage. 
In an econometric test, I analyzed how diplomatic tensions, measured through foreign 
dignitaries’ meetings with the Dalai Lama, affect the likelihood of a visit of a Chinese leader. Since 
the Chinese government seeks to contain the expression of opinions that challenge the status quo of 
Tibet, it reacts with harsh objections to any meeting of foreign officials with the Dalai Lama, the 
leader of the Tibetan community in exile. Therefore, such a deterioration of the bilateral political 
climate should harm bilateral diplomatic exchange. The econometric results showed that the likelihood 
of the Chinese leadership traveling to a country is indeed lower if the country’s government receives 
the Dalai Lama in a given year. Supporting the idea that economic diplomacy can help restore the 
bilateral climate, Chinese leadership trips are more likely in the year following a Dalai Lama reception 
in a particular country. This shows that governments rapidly put efforts into the restoration of bilateral 
ties. Taken together, the findings are evidence in favor of economic diplomacy being an important 
channel linking the bilateral political climate and economic exchange between nations. 
Future research should help improve our understanding of the importance and mechanisms 
guiding various forms of China’s economic diplomacy. For example, more attention should be 
devoted to the analysis of the increasing role of preferential trading agreements (e.g., Antkiewicz and 
Whalley 2005; Hicks and Kim 2012) and economic aid (e.g., Dreher and Fuchs 2015; Strange et al. 
forthcoming) in China’s toolbox of economic diplomacy. Moreover, while our focus was on trade, 
more research is warranted on the role of economic diplomacy in investment flows (Cheung et al. 
2012; Chen et al. 2015), contracted engineering projects (Cheung et al. 2014), the allocation of Special 
Economic Zones (Bräutigam and Tang 2011), or the promotion of the Renminbi as a world currency 
(Liao and McDowell 2015, forthcoming), among many other areas of China’s growing economic 
engagement in the world.  
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Table 1: Chinese leadership travel and Dalai Lama meetings with government members (1998-2006) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Travel Travel Travel Travel Travel 
  OLS Logit FE Cond. Logit 2SLS FE 
DL meets government member -0.136*** -1.227*** -0.151*** -1.187** -0.204*** 
(0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.010) (0.006) 
(log) GDP per capita 0.028*** 0.355** 0.047 -0.391 0.046 
(0.006) (0.045) (0.620) (0.793) (0.629) 
(log) Population 0.052*** 0.632*** 0.257 8.648** 0.269 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.293) (0.049) (0.265) 
(log) Trade with China 0.001 -0.006 -0.004 -0.029 -0.004 
(0.887) (0.966) (0.696) (0.770) (0.674) 
Openness 0.001*** 0.006*** -0.001 -0.018 -0.001 
(0.003) (0.008) (0.234) (0.113) (0.233) 
Energy/GNI 0.000 0.006 0.006** 0.095** 0.006** 
(0.569) (0.559) (0.035) (0.013) (0.031) 
Minerals/GNI -0.002 0.002 -0.002 -0.075 -0.003 
(0.658) (0.980) (0.861) (0.678) (0.855) 
Polity -0.001 -0.010 0.004 0.065 0.004 
(0.709) (0.640) (0.282) (0.306) (0.265) 
UNGA voting -0.080 -0.078 0.084 1.452 0.089 
(0.243) (0.907) (0.461) (0.471) (0.427) 
Taiwan recognition -0.037** -0.015 -11.272*** -0.015 
(0.023) (0.763) (0.000) (0.766) 
(log) Arms exports from China 0.013 0.101 0.006 -0.009 0.006 
(0.260) (0.405) (0.666) (0.937) (0.644) 
UN sanction 0.049 0.725 -0.055 -11.928*** -0.054 
(0.581) (0.524) (0.498) (0.000) (0.499) 
US sanction -0.077** -1.138** -0.052 -0.582 -0.053 
(0.012) (0.031) (0.138) (0.180) (0.125) 
(log) Distance -0.010 -0.264 
(0.720) (0.336) 
Neighbor 0.228*** 1.778*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
OECD 0.025 0.051 
(0.471) (0.884) 
G-20 0.089** 0.161 
(0.011) (0.478) 
Asia -0.036 -0.608 
(0.281) (0.161) 
Africa 0.015 -0.037 
  (0.506) (0.912)       
R-Squared 0.16 0.04 0.03 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.19 0.10 
Angrist–Pischke F test 46.36 
Hansen J (p value) 0.673 
Kleibergen Paap LM test (p value) 0.000 
Number of countries 156 140 156 78 152 
Number of observations 1319 1174 1319 689 1315 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the country level (in parentheses). All regressions include year 
dummies. * (**, ***) indicates statistical significance at the ten-percent (five-percent, one-percent) 
level.  
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Table 2: Chinese leadership travel and Dalai Lama meetings (time-event specifications, 1998-2006) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Travel Travel Travel Travel 
  FE Cond. Logit FE Cond. Logit 
DL meets government member (t+2) -0.012 -0.180 
(0.809) (0.616) 
DL meets government member (t+1) 0.048 0.303 
(0.429) (0.455) 
DL meets government member (t) -0.111** -0.881** 
(0.011) (0.049) 
DL meets government member (t-1) 0.187*** 1.012** 
(0.007) (0.011) 
DL meets government member (t-2) -0.015 0.015 
(0.763) (0.969) 
DL meets government member (t-3) -0.050 -0.503 
(0.314) (0.197) 
DL meets political leader (t+2) -0.034 -0.228 
(0.529) (0.612) 
DL meets political leader (t+1) 0.007 0.048 
(0.918) (0.922) 
DL meets political leader (t) -0.135*** -1.132** 
(0.004) (0.016) 
DL meets political leader (t-1) 0.094 0.475 
(0.241) (0.343) 
DL meets political leader (t-2) -0.091 -0.596 
(0.217) (0.327) 
DL meets political leader (t-3) -0.078 -0.715 
(0.212) (0.144) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.05   0.04   
Pseudo R-Squared 0.11 0.10 
Number of countries 156 78 156 78 
Number of observations 1319 689 1319 689 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the country level (in parentheses). All regressions include year 
dummies and the other control variables from Table 1. * (**, ***) indicates statistical significance at 
the ten-percent (five-percent, one-percent) level.
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Table 3: Chinese leadership travel and Dalai Lama meetings (alternative specifications, 1998-2006) 
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FE FE FE FE FE FE 
DL meets government member -0.151*** -0.119** -0.101*** -0.051 -0.208** -0.113*** 
(0.003) (0.019) (0.007) (0.255) (0.017) (0.007) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 
Number of countries 156 156 156 156 156 156 
Number of observations 1319 1319 1319 1319 1319 1319 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the country level (in parentheses). All regressions include year 
dummies and the other control variables from Table 1. * (**, ***) indicates statistical significance at 
the ten-percent (five-percent, one-percent) level.  
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Figure 1: Norway’s exports of Salmonidae (fresh/chilled) before and after the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize 
 
Note: Values are normalized to take a value of one in the last quarter of 2010 when the 
Nobel Peace Prize was conferred. 
Source: Own figure based on Davis et al. (2014) using data from Eurostat. 
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Figure 2: China’s diplomatic ties over time (1950-2014) 
 
Note: The graph shows the number of countries (entities) that recognize the Republic of China (ROC, 
Taiwan) rather than the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The dots indicate the number of embassies 
received/sent by the government in Beijing (PRC). The vertical line indicates year in which the PRC 
replaced the ROC in the United Nations. 
Source: Own figure based on data from Rhamey et al. (2013) and own update of data from Rich 
(2009). 
 
Figure 3: Number of years with visit by Chinese president or premier (1998-2006) 
 
Source: Own figure based on data from Kastner and Saunders (2012)  
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Appendix: Variables, sources and descriptive statistics 
Variable Source Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent variables       
Travel Kastner and Saunders (2012) 1719 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 
Travel (no multilaterals) Kastner and Saunders (2012) 1719 0.08 0.28 0.00 1.00 
Travel (president) Kastner and Saunders (2012) 1719 0.05 0.23 0.00 1.00 
Travel (prime minister) Kastner and Saunders (2012) 1719 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00 
(log) Travel duration Kastner and Saunders (2012) 1719 0.14 0.43 0.00 2.40 
Diplomacy Bader (2015) 1712 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00 
Variables of interest       
DL meets government member Fuchs and Klann (2013) 1746 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 
DL meets political leader Fuchs and Klann (2013) 1746 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00 
Control variables       
(log) GDP per capita World Bank (2014) 1656 7.99 1.64 4.87 11.75 
(log) Population World Bank (2014) 1719 15.39 2.17 9.14 20.99 
(log) Trade with China UN Comtrade 1746 13.40 4.24 0.00 21.47 
Openness World Bank (2014) 1604 84.44 49.19 0.31 531.74 
Energy/GNI World Bank (2014) 1613 3.75 9.34 0.00 75.44 
Minerals/GNI World Bank (2014) 1630 0.27 1.12 0.00 15.85 
Polity Marshall et al. (2013) 1445 13.05 6.62 0.00 20.00 
UNGA voting Strezhnev and Voeten (2012) 1701 0.78 0.14 0.15 0.96 
Taiwan recognition Rich (2009) 1700 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 
(log) Arms transfers from China SIPRI (2015) 1746 0.16 0.73 0.00 5.70 
UN sanction Hufbauer et al. (2007) 1746 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00 
US sanction Hufbauer et al. (2007) 1746 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 
(log) Distance Mayer and Zignago (2011) 1701 8.98 0.55 6.70 9.87 
Neighbor Mayer and Zignago (2011) 1701 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 
OECD Own construction 1746 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00 
G-20 Own construction 1746 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 
Asia Mayer and Zignago (2011) 1746 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Africa Mayer and Zignago (2011) 1746 0.27 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Instrumental variables       
Tibet Support Groups Fuchs and Klann (2013) 1746 0.54 2.49 0.00 31.00 
DL travel Fuchs and Klann (2013) 1746 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 
DL days Fuchs and Klann (2013) 1746 0.86 6.54 0.00 124.00 
Note: All time-varying control variables are lagged by one year. 
 
